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1THE “LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN PERFORMANCE” IN THE LAW ON 
PENALTIES
Solène Rowan*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the conjoined appeals of Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi and 
ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis,1 the Supreme Court rewrote the law on penalties. It jettisoned the 
familiar requirement that an agreed damages clause2 must be a genuine pre-estimate of loss in 
order to be enforceable and shifted the inquiry to whether the clause is justifiable and not 
unconscionable. A damages clause is now enforceable if it creates a secondary obligation 
which seeks to protect a legitimate interest of the injured party in the performance of the 
contract and imposes a detriment which is not out of all proportion in comparison to that 
interest.3
The concept of “legitimate interest in performance” is at the heart of this new test and 
therefore of considerable practical importance. However, it was left undefined by the 
Supreme Court, which gave only the following general guidance on what might or might not 
constitute a legitimate interest: there can be no legitimate interest in punishing the defaulting 
party;4 in many cases, compensation adequately serves the legitimate interest of the injured 
party;5 there may be circumstances in which the injured party has an interest in the 
enforcement of the primary obligation which is not satisfied by the recovery of compensatory 
damages;6 where the injured party has an interest that goes beyond compensation, a damages 
clause that has no relationship with loss and which aims to deter breach may be justified.7
In the absence of more precise judicial guidance, the reformulation of the rule on 
penalties around the requirement of a legitimate interest raises a number of questions. What is 
a legitimate interest in performance that extends beyond compensation? What considerations 
should be taken into account in determining whether there is such an interest? In what 
circumstances is the interest likely to be made out? These questions will inevitably arise in 
practice, particularly where damages clauses seek not simply to compensate but to achieve 
wider and non-compensatory objectives. 
There are no clear answers to these questions, whether in Makdessi or the ensuing 
literature on the case.8 Some clues can however be found in brief references that were made 
                                                          
* My thanks are owed to Gregg Rowan and the editor and the anonymous referees of the Cambridge Law 
Journal for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. I am also grateful to Nick McBride for providing me 
with materials on the “legitimate interest” requirement in other contexts than remedies for breach of contract 
and to Charlotte Thomas of Brick Court Chambers for sharing her BCL dissertation, “Reconceptualising White 
and Carter”. 
1 [2016] A.C. 172. For ease of reference, the conjoined appeals will be referred to in this article simple as 
Makdessi.
2 Or another type of clause that falls within the scope of the penalty rule.
3 At [32] per Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption; [152] per Lord Mance; [255] per Lord Hodge.
4 At [32] per Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption; [243] per Lord Hodge.
5 At [32] per Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption; [255] per Lord Hodge.
6 At [28]-[32], [99] Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption; [152] per Lord Mance; [255] per Lord Hodge.
7 Ibid. 
8 The exceptions are H. Beale (ed.), Chitty on Contracts, 32nd edn. (London 2015) at [26-198]-[21-210] which
contains a short but excellent section that seeks to identify some of the situations in which an injured party is 
likely to have a legitimate interest in performance that goes beyond compensation and the Scottish Law 
2by the Supreme Court to principles that apply elsewhere in the law on remedies where 
concepts of legitimate interest in performance have featured in the court's reasoning.9 These 
are the exercise of the right to affirm following a repudiatory breach and specific 
performance. This article seeks to examine these clues and the contexts in which the courts 
have previously drawn upon a legitimate interest in performance. Its purpose is to bring 
clarity to what is meant by legitimate interest in performance in the context of penalties, as 
well as to make suggestions as to the circumstances in which damages clauses which go 
beyond simply compensating the injured party’s loss will be acceptable. 
The discussion begins with a survey of the antecedents of the legitimate interest in 
performance in the law on remedies. It has been turned to by the courts in other areas not 
only including the right to affirm following a repudiatory breach and specific performance, as 
the Supreme Court noted, but also gain-based damages.10 This is followed by analysis of how 
“legitimate interest” operates in these areas and the extent of the parallels with the legitimate 
interest in the context of the rule on penalties. It seeks to show that there are some potentially 
helpful parallels but it is not possible to distil from them clear guidance as to how the new 
test will operate. Indeed, possibly adding to the confusion, there are similar uncertainties as to 
the meaning of legitimate interest in at least some of these areas. On the current case law, the 
concept of legitimate interest is surprisingly hard to pin down. Important questions therefore 
remain.
The article then assesses what considerations are or might be relevant in determining 
whether a party has a legitimate interest in performance that goes beyond compensation. 
These are divined by analysing Makdessi, some post-Makdessi cases, and also case law in the 
other contexts cited by the Supreme Court as well as gain-based damages. Relevant 
considerations include the importance of the obligation to which the damages clause attaches, 
the seriousness of the consequences of its breach, the impact on the interests of third parties, 
the protection of the public interest, the protection of non-financial expectations, and the 
presence or absence of certain characteristics in the contracting parties. The conclusion drawn 
is that a damages clause which goes beyond the injured party’s loss is more likely to be 
acceptable where it relates to an essential obligation of the contract, the breach of which 
could have serious consequences, and/or it protects the interests of third parties or the public 
in general, or non-monetary expectations. Such an outcome is particularly likely where the 
clause has been agreed by sophisticated contracting parties. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Commission’s Discussion Paper on Penalty Clauses No 162 (2016) at paras 3.23-3.26, 3.49, 3.51, 3.55-3.59, 
3.62, 5.38-5.61 and Report on Review of Contract Law: Formation, Interpretation, Remedies for Breach of 
Contract, and Penalty Clauses No 252 (2018) at paras 20.20-20.26, which contain very useful materials on the 
“legitimate interest” requirement. The topic is however fertile ground for further analysis and this paper
elaborates upon, adds to, and also diverges from the conclusions of Chitty and the Scottish Law Commission.  
The aim of the article is to explore the requirement in depth rather than to criticise it and suggest more fitting 
solutions. It has already been the subject of extensive criticism in the literature, see: A. Summers, “Unresolved 
Issues in the Law on Penalty” L.M.C.L.Q. 95; F. Dawson, “Determining Penalties as a Matter of Construction” 
[2016] L.M.C.L.Q. 207; J. Morgan, “The Penalty Clause Doctrine: Unlovable but Untouchable” [2016] C.L.J.
11; C. Conte, “The Penalty Rule Revisited” (2016) 132 LQR 382; J. Fisher, “Rearticulating the Rule Against 
Penalty Clauses” [2016] LMCLQ 169.
9 At [29]-[30] per Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption.
10 The article focuses on the role of “legitimate interest in performance” in the context of remedies for breach of 
contract as this is most relevant to damages clauses. “Legitimate interest” also has a role in the law of restraint 
of trade (Countrywide Assured Financial Services Ltd v Smart [2004] EWHC 1214 (Ch.)), the assignment of a 
right to sue for damages in tort (Simpson v Norfolk and Norwich University Hospital NHS Trust [2012] Q.B. 
640), and the law of conspiracy (Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed & Co Ltd v Veitch [1942] A.C. 453).
3II. THE “LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN PERFORMANCE” IN MAKDESSI
In laying down the new rule on penalties, the Supreme Court did not dwell on the meaning of 
the injured party's legitimate interest in performance. It did however give general guidance on 
when compensation will fulfil the interest and also the relatively rare circumstances in which 
the interest will go beyond compensation.
A. The Legitimate Interest in Performance Rarely Extends Beyond Compensation
Although the Supreme Court in Makdessi did not analyse the legitimate interest in 
performance, several points that are helpful to understanding the requirement emerge from 
the various judgments of the court. First, the legitimate interest of the injured party is in the 
enforcement of the primary obligation or in some appropriate alternative to performance.11
Second, the nature and breadth of the interest varies from case to case.12 And third, the aim of 
the court’s inquiry into the legitimate interest is to determine the appropriate remedial 
response to the defaulting party's failure to perform. In particular, it seeks to establish 
whether the injured party's interest in performance is fulfilled by compensation or only a 
remedial response that goes beyond compensation will suffice. 
The principal judgment, given jointly by Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption, with 
whom Lord Clarke and Lord Carnwath agreed, makes clear that in many situations the 
interest of the injured party will be satisfied by monetary compensation alone. As they put it, 
“in straightforward damages cases, that interest will rarely extend beyond compensation for 
breach, and we therefore expect that Lord Dunedin’s four tests would usually be perfectly 
adequate to determine its validity”.13 This is unsurprising. The purpose of a great many 
damages clauses is simply to compensate the loss resulting from the breach, and this is 
achieved by fixing in advance the level of damages that are payable in respect of the loss. 
This gives certainty to the parties regarding the quantum of damages that will be payable and, 
for the defaulting party, as to its potential liability. 
It is therefore clear that, where damages clauses are intended to be compensatory in 
nature, loss remains the main yardstick for assessing their validity. As a result, the exercise 
undertaken by the courts before Makdessi of comparing the stipulated sum against the 
foreseeable loss resulting from breach is still relevant. A compensatory clause will continue 
to be a penalty and unenforceable if the agreed level of damages is exorbitant or wholly 
disproportionate in comparison with “the highest level of damages that could possibly arise 
from the breach”.14
That the legitimate interest of the injured party will rarely extend beyond 
compensation is consistent with the central role of compensation in remedies that arise by 
operation of law. Compensatory damages are at the top of the hierarchy of remedies for 
breach.15 Compensating the injured party's losses is perceived to be the most satisfactory and 
effective way of protecting his contractual expectations. It is only where his expectations are 
not satisfactorily fulfilled by compensation that the question arises as to whether another 
remedial response may be more suitable.
                                                          
11 At [32] per Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption; [255] per Lord Hodge.
12 At [28]-[32], [99] per Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption; [152] per Lord Mance; [255] per Lord Hodge.
13 At [32] per Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption; [255] per Lord Hodge.
14 At [255] per Lord Hodge.
15 A. Burrows, “Damages for Breach of Contract: A Developing Hierarchy?” (2003) 35 Bracton L.J. 28, 43.
4B. The Legitimate Interest in Performance Can Extend Beyond Compensation
The Supreme Court in Makdessi emphasised that there are however circumstances in which 
the injured party’s contractual expectations are not satisfied by compensation.16 To protect 
these expectations, the parties may wish to agree a damages clause that provides for damages 
in excess of the injured party’s loss and has broader, non-compensatory objectives including 
the deterrence of breach. Since Makdessi, loss is no longer the only benchmark against which 
these clauses are assessed and, as a result, a damages clause that goes beyond compensation 
can now be valid.17
This reflects a more liberal approach to the contractual wishes of the parties and their 
possible reasons for agreeing to a damages clause that goes beyond compensation. Its effect 
is to give the courts greater flexibility and increase the prospects of damages clauses being 
enforced. This in turn gives the parties more scope to reinforce the protection of their 
contractual interests. They can tailor the level of protection to reflect their particular 
circumstances. 
In both Makdessi and Beavis, the Supreme Court found that the injured party had a 
legitimate interest that justified a remedy going beyond compensation. Makdessi concerned 
two disputed clauses under which the buyer of a controlling interest in a business could 
withhold the final two instalments of the purchase price and acquire the sellers’ shares at a 
price that excluded the value of its goodwill, if the sellers subsequently competed with the 
business. These clauses were not compensatory in nature and sought to deter breach yet they 
were held to be valid. The reason is that they were designed to protect the legitimate interest 
of the buyer in maintaining the goodwill of the business. This was essential to its value and 
the sellers’ compliance was critical in preserving the goodwill. 
In Beavis, the Supreme Court held that the management company of a car park had a 
legitimate interest in enforcing an £85 parking charge against a driver who had overstayed the 
two hour limit on parking. Although the fine was not compensatory and was designed to deter 
motorists from overstaying, the management company had a legitimate interest in the 
efficient use of the parking spaces for the benefit of other motorists, as well as in discharging 
its obligation to the owners of the car park and generating an income stream from the charges 
to meet its operating costs.
That contracting parties may have an interest in performance that goes beyond 
compensation had been accepted for some time before Makdessi in the default remedial 
regime. There was growing recognition in the case law and literature that parties enter into 
contracts for many reasons and that compensation is not always sufficient or adequate to 
protect their interests. It had been acknowledged for instance that parties can enter into a 
contract to obtain subjective and non-monetary gain and that loss is not always measurable in 
terms of market value.18 It had also been recognised that performance can have intrinsic value 
and an enforceable promise should confer on the injured party an entitlement to the promised 
performance, not simply an equivalent economic benefit.19
                                                          
16 At [28]-[32], [99] per Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption; [152] per Lord Mance; [255] per Lord Hodge.
17 Ibid..
18 Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forstyh [1996] A.C. 344 (HL); Farley v Skinner [2002] 2 A.C. 732 
(HL); D. Harris, A. Ogus and J. Phillips “Contract Remedies and the Consumer Surplus” (1979) 95 L.Q.R. 581.
19 Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd v Panatown Ltd [2001] 1 A.C. 518 (HL) per Lord Goff and Lord Millett.
5This recognition that compensation does not always satisfactorily protect the 
contractual interests in play led to calls for the courts to grapple with the fundamental 
question of what constitutes loss and for remedies for breach of contract to be strengthened.20
There has been a notable trend in the authorities towards the adoption of a broader approach 
to the concept of loss and increased protection of the performance interest. It is apparent for 
instance in the creation of exceptions to the general principle that non-pecuniary loss does not 
sound in damages,21 the suggestion that defeated expectations may amount to loss,22 and 
gain-based monetary awards being made.23
In these contexts and with agreed damages clauses, a similar evolution is therefore 
discernible. Compensation remains the central remedial response and is considered to be 
satisfactory in most situations. However, where it fails to protect the wider contractual
objectives of the parties, there is now acceptance that more robust protection of performance 
is appropriate. The distinguishing characteristic of damages clauses is that it is the parties 
themselves rather than the courts that identify this need. Since Makdessi, the courts will help 
them to meet the need and achieve better protection of performance by enforcing damages 
clauses more extensively and flexibly.   
III. OTHER CONTEXTS WHERE “LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN 
PERFORMANCE” IS RELEVANT
When then will the injured party have an interest in performance which justifies the 
enforcement of a clause that goes beyond compensation? In laying down the new rule on 
penalties, the Supreme Court gave no clear answer to this question. It did however point, 
albeit in relatively general terms, to two other contexts, both concerning remedies for breach, 
in which a requirement of legitimate interest has been recognised. These are the line of cases 
that began with the well-known House of Lords decision on the right to affirm following a 
repudiatory breach, White and Carter (Councils) Ltd v McGregor,24 and specific 
performance.25 No mention was made of the other area of the law on remedies in which 
legitimate interest also plays a significant role, gain-based damages. However, following the 
same analogical reasoning, it is apt to consider whether there are parallels between the 
legitimate interest in that context and the requirement in the new test on penalties.  
These areas of law will be considered in turn and the role of the legitimate interest in 
performance prior to Makdessi explained. It will be shown that the courts have had recourse 
to the requirement where compensatory damages have been inadequate to protect contractual 
expectations. In each of these areas, it has conferred on the courts a wide discretion, enabling 
them to be creative in granting relief, particularly in hard cases. Consideration will also be 
given to whether the requirement of a legitimate interest in performance in these contexts is 
the same as that in Makdessi. 
                                                          
20 On the efficacy of the remedial system in protecting the performance interest, see E. McKendrick, “Breach of 
Contract and the Meaning of Loss” (1999) 52 C.L.P.; S. Rowan, Remedies for Breach of Contract, A 
Comparative Analysis of the Protection of Performance (Oxford 2012).
21 Ruxley Electronics [1996] A.C. 344 (HL); Watts v Morrow [1991] 1 W.L.R. 1421; Farley v Skinner [2002] 2 
A.C. 732 (HL)
22 Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd v Panatown Ltd [2001] 1 A.C. 518 (HL) per Lord Goff and Lord Millett.
23 A.G. v Blake [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (HL) and see also the use of “negotiating damages”, also known as Wrotham 
Park damages.
24 [1962] AC 413 (HL Sc).
25 At [29] and [30] per Lord Neuberger and lord Sumption.
6A. The Right to Affirm After a Repudiatory Breach
Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption said that White and Carter26 supported the view that “the 
law will not generally make a remedy available to a party, the adverse impact of which on the 
defaulter significantly exceeds any legitimate interest of the innocent party”.27 It is however 
questionable whether there are genuine parallels between the legitimate interests in White and 
Carter and Makdessi.
1. White and Carter (Councils) Ltd v McGregor
The concept of a “legitimate interest in performance” has had a role for more than 60 years 
where, following the defaulting party's repudiatory breach, the injured party seeks to affirm 
the contract, perform his remaining obligations and sue for the contract price. In the leading 
authority, White and Carter,28 the sales manager of a garage entered into a contract with 
advertising agents for them to display its advertisements on street litter bins for a period of 3 
years. Almost immediately after the contract had been concluded, the owner of the garage 
purported to cancel the contract, thereby repudiating it. The advertising agents declined to 
accept the repudiation, displayed the advertisements and sued the garage owner for the agreed 
price. 
In the House of Lords, it was held by a majority of three to two that the advertising 
agents were not obliged to accept the repudiation and confined to recovering damages. They 
were entitled to the contract price. Lord Hodson, with whom Lord Tucker agreed, rested his 
decision on the principle that repudiation by one party does not itself discharge the contract 
and leave the other to his remedy in damages for breach. If there is no acceptance of the 
repudiation, the contract remains alive for the benefit of both parties. Lord Reid, while taking 
the same general view, suggested two possible limitations: first, performance by the injured 
party should not require the co-operation of the other party; second, he must have a legitimate 
interest in performing the contract rather than claiming damages. He said “…it may well be 
that, if it can be shown that a person has no legitimate interest, financial or otherwise, in 
performing the contract, rather than claiming damages, he ought not to be allowed to saddle 
the other party with an additional burden with no benefit to himself”.29 Lord Reid therefore 
seemed to recognise that contracting parties can insist on performing their contractual 
obligations, albeit subject to these limitations. 
White and Carter has been affirmed and Lord Reid’s limitations applied in later cases. 
However, the courts have never satisfactorily unpacked the notion of “legitimate interest” in 
this context.30 Lord Reid did not explain its meaning or origins and no clear definition or 
guidance has emerged in subsequent cases, although some further light has been shed on 
when a legitimate interest will arise. The Aquafaith31 is a recent example. In that case, Cooke 
                                                          
26 [1962] AC 413 (HL Sc).
27 At [29] per Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption.
28 [1962] AC 413 (HL Sc).
29 Ibid. at 431.
30 Most recently see MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co SA v Cottonex Anstalt [2017] 2 All E.R. (Comm) (CA), 
[40] per Moore-Bick L.J.: “it may well be that the implications of Lord Reid’s observations in White & Carter
and the principles of law which underpin it have yet to be fully identified…”. See also the excellent article by Q. 
Liu, “The White & Carter Principle: A Restatement” 74 M.L.R. (2011) 171.
31 Isabella Shipowner SA v Shagang Shipping Co Ltd (The “Aquafaith”) [2012] 1 C.L.C. 899. See also Gator 
Shipping Corporation v Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd (The “Odenfeld”) [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 357 (QB) and Ocean 
Marine Navigation Ltd v Koch Carbon Inc (The “Dynamic”) [2003] EWHC 1936 (Comm.).
7J held that the defaulting party has no legitimate interest in keeping the contract alive where 
damages are an adequate remedy and his insistence on performing is “wholly unreasonable”, 
a “commercial absurdity” or “perverse”.32 Whilst helpful to identifying whether there is a 
legitimate interest in rendering performance, this does not explain the notion and it remains 
uncertain when such an interest will be found to exist. 
The exceptionality conveyed by the terms used in The Aquafaith33 suggests that the 
concept of legitimate interest in this context is narrow. In most circumstances, the injured 
party should be able to insist on performance and claim the agreed price. Performance is the 
rule and a finding that the injured party has no interest in performing will be rare.34 It is not 
sufficient to show that he might mitigate his loss and claim damages for any shortfall or that 
he behaved unreasonably in the conventional sense of the term.35 The degree of 
unreasonableness in his election to keep the contract alive must be severe for the courts to 
interfere.36
Rare are the examples of attempts to keep a contract alive that have been found to be 
wholly unreasonable. Such examples as exist include where performance was economically 
futile or the sole aim was to generate a revenue stream. For instance, in The Puerto 
Buitrago,37 the owners of a vessel could not keep a charterparty open until the charterers had 
fulfilled their repair obligations so as to recover hire that would accrue until the vessel was 
redelivered. This would be wholly unreasonable since the cost of repair was double the value 
of the ship when repaired and four times as much as its scrap value.38 Similarly, in MSC 
Mediterranean Shipping Co SA v Cottonex Anstalt,39 a carrier could not affirm a contract 
with a shipper to carry raw cotton under which the shipper had to return the containers to the 
carrier within 14 days of discharge from the vessel in circumstances where the carrier's only 
purpose in affirming was to claim ongoing demurrage from the shipper for the late return of 
the containers. Whilst clearly in default, the shipper was no longer able to return the 
containers and the commercial purpose of the venture had become frustrated.40
2. Interest in obtaining performance v interest in performing
The Supreme Court's reliance on White and Carter to support a new legitimate interest 
requirement in the context of penalties was by no means obvious. White and Carter is itself 
controversial. It has been criticised for allowing the injured party to render performance that 
is no longer wanted by the defaulting party, seemingly contravening the duty to mitigate and 
                                                          
32 Ibid. at [44]. 
33 [2012] 1 C.L.C. 899. 
34 Ibid. at [46]. White and Carter being a Scottish case, it is worth noting that it was followed by the First 
Division of the Court of Session in Salaried Staff London Co v Swears & Wells 1985 SC 185; however it has 
never been applied so as to prevent the injured party from keeping the contract alive, as illustrated by AMA New 
Town Ltd v Law 2013 SC 608.
35 Ibid. at [42]. See also Reichman v Beveridge [2007] Bus L.R. 412 (CA)
36 Ibid.
37 Attica Sea Carriers Corp v Ferrostaal Poseid on Bulk Reederei GmbH (The “Puerto Buitrago”) [1976] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 250 (CA).
38 Ibid. at 255 per Lord Denning M.R..
39 [2017] 2 All E.R. (Comm).
40 Ibid. at [43], although Moore-Bick L.J. thought that this was not a case in which White and Carter applied 
since it was not open to the carrier to affirm the contract once the commercial purpose of the contract had 
become frustrated. He added however that, had this not been the case, “this is a classic case in which it would 
have been wholly unreasonable for the carrier to insist on further performance”.
8leading to waste.41 The absence of any clear definition of legitimate interest in this context 
and the difficulty in articulating its meaning have also led to criticism. Lord Reid’s 
qualification has been described as a “puzzle”,42 “vague”,43 “unintelligible and elusive”44 and 
suffering from “severe obscurity”.45 Some have argued that it should be abandoned 
altogether.46
It is also unclear whether there is any real nexus between the legitimate interests in 
White and Carter and Makdessi. After all, Makdessi was concerned with a damages clause, 
which is a secondary obligation that provides for the consequences of breach47 and is 
designed to protect the contractual expectations of the injured party in case of default. In that 
respect, it protects the injured party's interest in obtaining performance. In contrast, the 
legitimate interest of Lord Reid in White and Carter is concerned with the interest of the 
injured party in rendering performance, that is, in performing his own primary obligations 
under the contract. The key question is whether the injured party can insist on performing his 
side of the bargain. If so, his right to obtain the agreed sum is engaged, avoiding the need for 
him to resort to claiming damages. 
This distinction between the interest in obtaining performance and the interest in 
rendering performance has rarely been articulated.48 Only the former interest has been given 
any significant attention in the case law and literature. Nevertheless, it should be relatively 
uncontroversial that the party whose obligation under the contract is to deliver the goods, 
services or other consideration may himself wish to insist on rendering that performance. The 
reasons are numerous and not confined to obtaining the contract price. The protection or 
enhancement of his reputation and honouring commitments made to third parties are just 
some examples. 
That the two interests are different is also evident from the injured party almost 
always being considered to have a legitimate interest in performing his own obligations 
following the counterparty's repudiation but only exceptionally having a legitimate interest in 
the counterparty's performance that goes beyond compensation following a breach (of any 
kind). The injured party is assumed to have an interest in maintaining the contract rather than 
                                                          
41 A. Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract, 3rd edn (Oxford 2004) 440; S. Stoljar, “Some 
Problems of Anticipatory Breach” (1974) 9 Melb. U. L. Rev. 355. 
42 J.W. Carter, “White and Carter v McGregor – How Unreasonable?” (2012) 128 L.Q.R. 490, at p.491.
43 Ibid..
44 Liu, “The White & Carter Principle” at p.171.
45 Ibid..
46 J. O’Sullivan, “Repudiation: Keeping the Contract Alive” in G. Virgo and S. Worthington (eds.), Commercial 
Remedies: Resolving Controversies (Cambridge 2017), 51 who argues that the injured party should always be 
permitted to honour and perform to obtain the promised consideration subject to the policy concern to avoid 
stalemate and perpetual obligations. J. Morgan, “Smuggling Mitigation into White & Carter v McGregor: Time 
to Come Clean?” (2015) 4 LMCLQ 575 argues in favour of a general mitigation qualification on the right to 
elect to maintain performance. See however M P Gergen, “The Right to Perform after Repudiation and Recover 
the Contract Price in Anglo-American Law”, in L A DiMatteo and M Hogg (eds), Comparative Contract Law: 
British and American Perspectives (2015) 314, who is supportive of the legitimate interest test and seeks to 
articulate its objectives, in particular the avoidance of possible uncompensated loss for the injured party. The 
Scottish Law Commission in its Report on Review of Contract Law No 250 (2018), Chap 12, made no 
recommendation on direct reform of the law in this area and instead encouraged the Scottish courts to develop 
the legitimate interest test when the opportunity arises.
47 [2016] A.C. 172 at [32] per Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption; [241] per Lord Hodge.
48 It is however addressed in Liu, “The White & Carter Principle”, S. Whittaker, “Performance of Another’s 
Obligation: French and English Law Contrasted” in D. Johnston and R. Zimmerman (eds.), Unjustified 
Unrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge 2001) 433, and Rowan. “Remedies for Breach 
of Contract”.
9claiming damages in the White and Carter context. It is for the defaulting party to 
demonstrate to the contrary and the threshold is a high one.49 In contrast, the injured party 
will have an interest in obtaining performance rather than compensation only exceptionally, 
as is clear in the context of specific performance and gain-based awards. The same seems 
also to be true in the context of damages clauses, as is illustrated by the statement of Lord 
Neuberger and Lord Sumption that, with straightforward damages clauses, the legitimate 
interest will rarely extend beyond compensation for the breach.50 Whilst the interest in 
performing is strong, the interest in obtaining performance is weak. Their reference to Lord 
Reid’s qualification therefore seems incongruous.
The only parallels that can be drawn between the two contexts are at a relatively high 
level. One is that, at the heart of both legitimate interests is the performance of the contract 
and the protection of the injured party who wants performance to occur. In White and Carter, 
this was the party who wished to perform his obligations so as to earn the contract price.51
With damages clauses, it is the beneficiary of the promise to perform that is seeking to obtain 
the promised performance. 
Another parallel is that in both contexts the court must determine whether 
compensation is an adequate remedial response to which the injured party should be 
confined. In the context of White and Carter, the question is whether the injured party can 
perform in order to obtain the contract price and not merely compensation.52 With damages 
clauses, it is whether the parties can agree to a remedy that goes beyond compensation. 
That the legitimate interests in performance in these two contexts are different and 
also the significance of the difference casts doubt on the parallels drawn between them by the 
Supreme Court. The use of the same or similar terms in the two contexts should not simply be 
assumed to mean that the concepts can be equated. This is not to say that the legitimate 
interest in White and Carter should be ignored completely, particularly in the absence of any 
satisfactory explanation of the test in either context and as the courts continue to find their 
way in how both tests operate. They share some high level commonalities. However, it is 
important that any perceived parallels are scrutinised carefully and not simply accepted as 
correct on the basis of a premise that is superficially attractive but on close examination turns 
out to be substantively false or at best doubtful.
B. Specific Performance
Specific performance was also cited by Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption in support of a 
legitimate interest in performance in the new test on penalties as a context in which the courts 
require before granting relief that the injured party has a legitimate interest in performance 
that goes beyond compensation. They said that “the minimum condition for an order for 
specific performance is that the innocent party should have a legitimate interest extending 
beyond pecuniary compensation for the breach”. 53 This condition is imposed because 
specific performance protects the performance interest to a much greater extent than 
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The “Aquafaith” [2012] 1 C.L.C. 899 at [48]-[50] per Cooke J..
50 At [32] per Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption.
51 Liu, “The White & Carter Principle”.
52 MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co SA v Cottonex Anstalt [2017] 2 All E.R. (Comm) (CA), [40] per Moore-
Bick L.J..
53 At [29] and [30].
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compensation.54 The primary obligations of the defaulting party are enforced directly in that 
he is compelled to fulfil them.
The requirement of a legitimate interest in performance does not have the status of 
being part of the test for specific performance, as appears now to be the case for penalty 
clauses. Nevertheless, an injured party preferring performance to damages as a remedy must 
show that he has an interest in obtaining the very thing that he was promised as opposed to a 
substitute which a monetary award would allow him to buy.55 The most important hurdle to 
obtaining specific performance is that damages must be inadequate.56 This will depend to a 
large extent upon whether a substitute for the promised performance is obtainable in the 
market. Where the injured party is able to buy a satisfactory replacement, his expectations are 
deemed to be fulfilled by damages. In contrast, where a substitute is unavailable, damages are 
considered to be inadequate. In these instances, the injured party has an interest in 
performance that justifies a remedy that goes beyond compensation.
The requirement that damages be inadequate therefore operates to isolate the cases in 
which specific performance is more appropriate as a remedy than compensation. Frequently 
cited examples and indeed two of the few instances where specific performance is routinely 
awarded are contracts for the sale of land and contracts for the sale of unique goods. Each 
plot of land is considered to be unique and irreplaceable. As a result, damages for breach of 
such contracts will seldom be adequate. The buyer’s interest is not in obtaining 
compensation, which is ineffective to protect his contractual expectations; it is in obtaining 
performance itself. 
It is more readily apparent why Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption sought to draw 
support from specific performance than White and Carter. There are parallels between the 
legitimate interest requirements in the contexts of damages clauses and specific performance. 
The injured party must show that he has an interest in receiving what he contracted for. It 
enables the court to determine which remedy best fulfils his contractual expectations and, in 
particular, whether compensation is sufficient to protect these expectations. If not, then a 
remedial response that is non-compensatory and more robust is justified.
Another parallel is that the injured party is only rarely considered to have a legitimate 
interest in performance that goes beyond compensation in the two contexts. Confining 
specific performance to cases where damages are inadequate has the effect that the remedy is 
seldom available. It makes no difference that the injured party subjectively prefers 
performance over damages. In common with this, it will be unusual that a damages clause is 
found to protect an interest in performance that goes beyond compensation. This is clear from 
Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption's statement that the interest of the injured party will 
rarely extent beyond compensation for breach.57
As a result and as with specific performance, a legitimate interest that justifies a 
damages clause going beyond compensation will be rare in regular commercial contracts. 
Where compensatory damages can buy a satisfactory replacement for the bargained-for 
advantage, for instance where the subject-matter of the contract is a marketable commodity 
for which there is a readily obtainable substitute, damages clauses that over-compensate and 
seek to deter breach are unlikely to be justifiable. Conversely, there is greater scope for 
                                                          
54 D. Harris “Incentives to Perform or Break Contracts” (1992) 45(2) CLP 29, 30.
55 G. Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account (Oxford 1976) at [63]ff.
56 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [1998] A.C. 1 (HL) 11 per Lord 
Hoffmann. 
57 At [29] and [30].
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justifying a damages clause that departs from the compensatory measure in contracts for the 
sale of unique goods or the sale of land.58 Since no substitute is available, a compensatory 
damages clause is less likely to satisfy the interest in performance of the injured party.
However, the analogy between the two contexts has its limits. There are intrinsic 
differences between the two remedies which may impact on how the legitimate interest 
requirement operates. Specific performance is coercive and draconian in nature, compelling 
the defaulting party to perform. It is not available where there would be a risk of involuntary 
servitude for the defaulting party, which explains why it is not ordered to enforce personal 
service contracts.59 Similarly, for obligations to render a service, the unpalatable possibility 
of a specific performance order requiring constant court supervision usually means that the 
remedy is unavailable. This objection is particularly prominent in the context of building 
contracts.60 In contrast, damages clauses require only the payment of money, which is less 
likely to give rise to these issues. Therefore, while the injured party's interest in receiving 
what he contracted for may be defeated in claims for specific performance of obligations that 
are personal in nature or require constant supervision, these objections are unlikely to be fatal 
to a damages clause and the recognition that there is a legitimate interest in performance that 
justifies another remedial response than compensation.61
C. Gain-Based Damages 
Although not referred to in Makdessi, the legitimate interest in obtaining performance has 
also played a significant role in the context of restitutionary monetary awards. In the well-
known case of Attorney General v Blake,62 a majority of the House of Lords invoked the 
discretionary remedy of an account of profits to order the disgorgement of gains made by a 
spy from the publication of information that he had agreed with the Crown to keep secret. 
Lord Nicholls, giving the leading judgment, said:
An award of damages … is not always ‘adequate’ as a remedy ... The law 
recognises that a party to a contract may have an interest in performance which is 
not readily measurable in terms of money … [T]he plaintiff’s interest in 
performance may make it just and equitable that the defendant should retain no 
benefit from his breach of contract … An account of profits will be appropriate in 
exceptional circumstances … A useful guide … is whether the plaintiff had a 
legitimate interest in preventing the defendant's profit-making activity and, hence, 
in depriving him of his profit. 63
The pre-conditions to an account of profits being awarded are that other remedies for breach 
of contract are inadequate and the injured party has a legitimate interest in depriving the 
defaulting party of his profit. On the facts, other remedies were unavailable and the majority 
of the House of Lords also held that the Crown had a legitimate interest in preventing Blake 
from profiting. This was to ensure that there were no financial incentives for other members 
                                                          
58 Beale, Chitty on Contracts, at [26-201].
59 De Francesco v Barnum (1890) 45 Ch D 430; R v Incorporated Froebel Educational Institute Ex p L [199] 
E.L.R. 488 (QB).
60 E.g. Flint v Brandon (1803) 8 Ves 159.
61 Beale, Chitty on Contracts, [26-201].
62 A.G. v Blake [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (HL).
63 Ibid. at pp.282 and 285.
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of the intelligence service to reveal information in a similar way, lest morale and trust 
between members of the service be undermined. 
The legitimate interest in Blake has been controversial and criticised as “uncertain” 
and “open-ended” 64 and as importing a wide degree of judicial discretion.65 The House of 
Lords said very little on its meaning, instead explaining that it would be “difficult, and 
unwise, to attempt to be more specific’.66 In the words of Lord Steyn, the circumstances in 
which disgorgement of profits should be ordered are ‘best hammered out on the anvil of 
concrete cases”.67  It might be because of these uncertainties that the Supreme Court did not 
refer to the remedy in Makdessi.
Another possible reason is that a legitimate interest in performance that justifies 
disgorgement has rarely been made out in later cases and there has been little further judicial 
guidance on the scope of the remedy. Unsurprisingly, the lower courts have shown no 
inclination to explore an issue that the House of Lords openly avoided.  
One case in which Blake was applied is Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Niad Ltd.68 A petrol 
station owner breached an obligation to abide by recommended retail prices set by its fuel 
supplier, Esso, in return for financial support from Esso, which was operating a price-
matching scheme that aimed to undercut or compete with the prices of competitors. He did so 
by charging higher prices to customers. Insurmountable difficulties in attributing lost sales to 
the breach meant that compensatory damages were “almost impossible”69 to assess. As the 
breach was repeated and fundamentally undermined the whole price-matching scheme, the 
fuel supplier had a legitimate interest in enforcing the scheme and preventing the petrol 
station owner from profiting and was therefore entitled to an account of profits.
Following Blake and until very recently, the legitimate interest in depriving the 
defaulting party of his profits also featured in the court's reasoning when awarding 
“negotiating damages”, 70 more commonly known as Wrotham Park damages.71 This measure 
of damages compensates the injured party for the hypothetical price that he would have been 
willing to accept to release the defaulting party from the obligation that was breached and in 
many cases has been assessed as a proportion of the defaulting party’s profits from the 
breach. 
However, any requirement of a legitimate interest to claim negotiating damages was 
rejected by the Supreme Court in Morris Garner v One Step (Support) Ltd72 which, like 
Makdessi, involved the breach of non-compete covenants. Instead, the court held that 
negotiating damages are compensatory in nature and available “where the loss suffered by the 
claimant is appropriately measured by reference to the economic value of the right which has 
been breached”.73 As such, no question arises as to whether or not there is a legitimate 
interest in preventing the profit-making activity of the defaulting party.74 “Legitimate 
                                                          
64 Burrows, “Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract”, 403.
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66 [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (HL) at 285 per Lord Nicholls.
67 [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (HL) at 291 per Lord Steyn.
68 [2001] All E.R. (D) 324 (Ch).
69 Ibid. at [63] per Morritt V.C..
70 This term was preferred by the Supreme Court to “Wrotham Park damages” in Morris Garner v One Step 
(Support) Ltd [2018] UKSC 20.
71 Experience Hendrix LLC v PPX Enterprises Inc [2003] EWCA Civ 323 (CA).
72 [2018] UKSC 20.
73 Ibid. at [91] per Lord Reed.
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interest” was therefore rejected in One Step soon after being given new prominence in 
Makdessi. Yet in both cases the Supreme Court was confronted with the same fundamental 
issue of what constitutes loss and was pursuing the same objective of protecting goodwill.75
Despite One Step and indeed the absence of any reference in Makdessi to Blake, it is 
possible to draw broader parallels between the legitimate interest in performance that hitherto 
applied in this context and its new incarnation in relation to damages clauses. First, there are 
similarities in the nature and function of the requirement. In both contexts, the legitimate 
interest is that of the injured party and it is in obtaining performance of the promise made to 
him (as is also the case in the context of specific performance). The court seeks to establish 
whether there is a legitimate interest in the injured party obtaining a remedy beyond the 
normal compensatory measure. Only where this measure is warranted in order to protect his 
contractual expectations fully can the normal measure be departed from.  
Second, in both contexts, deterring breach and more generally influencing behaviour 
are legitimate objectives. The prospect of being stripped of profit disincentivises breach and 
encourages performance, as do over-compensatory damages clauses. In the context of 
disgorgement, this is achieved by depriving the defaulting party of gains that result from his 
breach.76 With damages clauses, it is the threat of the defaulting party having to make a large 
payment on breach. In both contexts, the deterrent effect is justifiable where, to use the words 
of Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption in Makdessi, “there is a legitimate interest in 
influencing the conduct of the contracting party which is not satisfied by the mere right to 
recover damages for breach”.77 These parallels suggest that, as with specific performance, the 
Supreme Court in Makdessi might have drawn support from the legitimate interest 
requirement in Blake.
IV. CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT TO THE “LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN 
PERFORMANCE”
If the injured party’s entitlement to rely on a damages clause that goes beyond compensation 
is to turn on the extent of his legitimate interest in performance, the court needs tools to 
measure this interest in each case. Some guidance can be drawn from the Supreme Court's 
reasoning on the facts of Makdessi and Beavis in deciding that there was a legitimate interest 
going beyond compensation in those cases. The link drawn by Lord Neuberger and Lord 
Sumption with the legitimate interest in White and Carter and specific performance and its 
relevance in respect of gain-based damages are also potentially fruitful sources of guidance. 
Whilst the primary purpose of this link appears to have been to justify the introduction of the 
new requirement for damages clauses, it was shown in the previous section of this article that 
there are clear parallels between the new requirement and the legitimate interest applied in 
these contexts, particularly specific performance and gain-based damages. The most 
important, and seemingly an essential pre-condition in each case, is that compensation is 
inadequate to fulfil the contractual expectations of the injured party such that a more robust 
remedial response is needed. These parallels raise the prospect that the considerations taken 
into account by the courts to determine when such a remedy is appropriate may also be 
relevant in the context of damages clauses and capable of informing when there will be a 
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legitimate interest in performance that justifies a damages clause that goes beyond 
compensation.   
This section of the article is concerned with identifying and exploring the 
considerations that have the greatest potential to be relevant to the legitimate interest test for 
agreed damages clauses. These can be divined from Makdessi itself, some post-Makdessi
cases, and also the case law in these other contexts. It is submitted that they are the 
importance of the term broken and the seriousness of the consequences of the breach on the 
injured party, the impact of breach on the interests of third parties, the protection of the public 
interest, the protection of non-financial expectations, and the presence or absence of certain 
characteristics in the parties. 
A. The Importance of the Obligation and the Seriousness of the Consequences of Breach
Two linked considerations that seem likely to be relevant to establishing a legitimate interest 
in performance that goes beyond compensation in respect of damages clauses are whether the 
obligation to which the clause attaches is of essential importance and the seriousness of the 
consequences of its breach. Where the obligation goes directly to the root of the contract or is 
essential to its working and objectives and breach would deprive the injured party of 
substantially the whole benefit that he intended to obtain, this can be expected to militate in 
favour of a finding that there is such an interest. The more important is the obligation 
breached and the more serious are the consequences of the breach for the injured party, the 
more likely there will be an interest in obtaining and encouraging performance. These 
considerations should be assessed at the time that the contract was made.78
Both considerations were relied upon in Makdessi itself and have also featured in 
other areas of the law of remedies. In Makdessi, the Supreme Court emphasised that the 
disputed non-compete covenants had been inserted so as to ensure the loyalty of the sellers 
and protect the goodwill of the business, which were at the very heart of the contract and 
critically important to the buyer. A significant proportion of the contract price was 
attributable to them79 since the value of the business was founded mainly on its goodwill, 
without which it would be worth much less.80 Breach of the covenants would have an impact 
on the whole business and be severely detrimental to its value, and would defeat the buyer's 
commercial objectives in acquiring the business.81 The buyer therefore had a legitimate in 
maintaining the goodwill.
The Supreme Court in Makdessi also placed weight on these considerations when 
analysing the seminal authority on penalty clauses, Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New 
Garage & Motor Co Ltd.82 In this well-known case, dealers in motor accessories had agreed, 
as part of a retail price maintenance scheme, not to sell tyres below a tyre manufacturers’ list 
price. The contract provided that the dealers would have to pay the manufacturers £5 for 
every tyre sold in breach of the undertaking. This was held by the House of Lords to be 
liquidated damages and therefore enforceable, rather than an unenforceable penalty, on the 
grounds that the loss likely to result from breach was difficult to assess and £5 was a genuine 
attempt to estimate loss. 
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The Supreme Court concurred with the reasoning of Lord Atkinson in Dunlop,83
which emphasised that the manufacturers had a wider interest in enforcing the damages 
clause than pecuniary compensation. This was in preventing the prices that they had set from 
being undercut and maintaining their trading system, which could only achieve its objectives 
if all of the trading partners adhered to it and charged the same prices for tyres. Breach would 
seriously undermine their trading system and injure their business. The disputed clause, 
which sought to guard against these consequences and in doing so protect their brand, 
reputation and goodwill and their authorised distribution network was therefore acceptable.84
The importance of the obligation to which the clause relates and the seriousness of the 
consequences of the breach have also been taken into account in relation to the enforceability 
of a damages clause in the cases that have followed Makdessi. In the Scottish case of Gray v 
Braid Group (Holdings) Ltd,85 for instance, an employee and director who was also a 
shareholder in the company had been dismissed for his involvement in two instances of 
bribery in connection with his work. The disputed term was a “bad leaver” provision in the 
company's Articles of Association, which provided that a shareholder employee or director 
who commits an act of gross misconduct or persistently underperforms should transfer his 
shares at subscription price. There was a large discrepancy between the current fair value of 
the dismissed employee’s shares and the subscription price. The issue was whether the bad 
leaver provision was penal. 
A majority of the Court of Session held that the provision was valid. The company 
had a legitimate interest in the faithful and diligent performance by its shareholders of their 
duties as employees and/or directors and the secondary obligation was not exorbitant despite 
the large discrepancy between the current fair value and the subscription price of the shares. 
In assessing whether there was a legitimate interest in performance, the court considered that
it was essential for the company that employees and directors performed their duties properly 
and that fraud and gross misconduct was deterred. Fraudulent conduct by shareholder 
employee or director could be and on the facts had been highly damaging to the injured party, 
both financially and also to the reputation of its business.86
In the same vein, in Vivienne Westwood Ltd v Conduit Street Development Ltd,87
another post-Makdessi case, the possibility that no serious consequences would result from 
the breach was a factor in the court's decision that there was no legitimate interest in 
performance going beyond compensation. The landlord and tenant of retail shop premises 
had agreed in a side letter to the lease to a reduction in the rent payable under the lease. If the 
tenant defaulted in any way, the landlord could terminate the side letter and the rent payable 
would revert back to its original level. As a result of some confusion, the tenant failed to 
make a monthly rent payment. When the landlord purported to terminate the side letter, the 
question arose as to whether its right to terminate upon any breach of the contract was penal 
and therefore unenforceable. 
The court recognised that the landlord had a financial interest in having a performing 
rather than a defaulting tenant. Moreover, this was capable of impacting on the value of its 
reversion in a way that might extend beyond cash flow benefits and financial compensation 
for delayed performance. However, this was only likely in cases of serious breaches of 
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contract. Where the breaches were minor or the consequences of non-performance of little 
significance, uncompensated loss was unlikely to follow. The disputed clause was held to be 
a penalty.88
That the importance of the term breached and the extent of the resulting loss are likely 
to be relevant considerations is reinforced by the weight given to these factors by the courts 
in the context of specific performance and gain-based damages. For instance, when 
considering whether or not to grant specific performance, the courts have shown willingness 
to take into account that the breach of contract, if remedied merely by damages, would cause 
serious disruption to the injured party’s business and might even lead to its insolvency. This 
point was made clearly by Megarry V-C in Howard Perry Ltd v British Railways Board,89 a 
case in which a strike made steel almost unobtainable, and steel stockholders sought a court 
order releasing steel that they owned but which was held unlawfully by a rail carrier. In 
ordering delivery of the steel, he said: 
[I]t can be said that as those who trade do so for profit, damages of a 
sufficient amount may compensate for any wrong. All that the plaintiffs 
are losing…is the sale of some steel, and damages will adequately 
compensate them for that. I do not think that this is by any means the 
whole picture. Damages would be a poor consolation if the failure of 
supplies forces a trader to lay off staff and disappoint his customers 
(whose affections may be transferred to others) and ultimately impels him 
towards insolvency.90
The potential relevance of serious business disruption or the risk of insolvency is also 
illustrated by Sky Petroleum Ltd v VIP Petroleum Ltd,91 in which the 1970s oil crisis had 
restricted the supply of petrol. Goulding J granted an interim injunction which had the effect 
of requiring specific performance of a contract to supply petrol. As the defaulting petrol 
supplier was the only available source of petrol, the injured petrol retailer was dependent on it 
performing the contract for the survival of its business. 
In the context of gain-based damages, the importance of the term breached and the 
consequences of the breach are also considerations relevant to whether there is a legitimate 
interest in performance that goes beyond compensation. When deciding whether the Crown 
had a legitimate interest in preventing Blake from profiting, the House of Lords took into 
account that an absolute rule against disclosure by members of the secret service was 
critically important to the effectiveness of the secret service. Its breach would put this in 
jeopardy by undermining the willingness of prospective informers to co-operate and the trust 
between members of the secret service engaged in dangerous activities.92 It would also cause 
“immeasurable damage” to the public interest.93
Similarly, in Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Niad Ltd,94 another case in which an account of 
profits was awarded, these considerations were relevant to the determination that the fuel 
supplier had a legitimate interest in preventing the petrol station owner from charging higher 
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prices to customers in breach of an obligation to abide by the fuel supplier's recommended 
retail prices. This obligation was entered into in return for financial support from the fuel 
supplier and was essential to the fuel supplier's price-matching scheme, which would be 
undermined by the petrol station owner's breach. 
B. The Impact of Breach on the Interests of Third Parties 
Another consideration that is likely to be relevant to whether there is a legitimate interest in 
performance that goes beyond compensation is the impact that breach or performance would 
have on third parties. This was taken into account by the Supreme Court in Beavis in support 
of its finding that there was a legitimate interest going beyond compensation in that case. The 
third parties concerned were the owners of the land where the carpark was located. Both the 
£85 charge and more generally the carparking scheme that ParkingEye operated were held to 
serve the interests of the landowners as well as those of ParkingEye. This was because the 
landowners received a fee from ParkingEye for the right to manage the car park and also 
enabled them to lease sites to retailers for which a car park is a valuable facility.95
The impact of breach on others is likely to be particularly significant where the third 
party cannot obtain a remedy in its own right. When awarding compensatory damages where 
there is no damages clause, the courts have taken account of the impact of breach on and the 
resulting losses for third parties where, because there is no privity of contract, they are unable 
to sue for breach and are deprived of a remedy. In some circumstances,96 the promisee, 
despite not suffering the loss, has been allowed to enforce contractual rights against the 
defaulting party on behalf of the third party.97 This has enabled the promisee to obtain 
damages for the losses suffered by the third party, but subject to an obligation to account to 
the third party. It can be expected that where the promisee provides for this same result 
through a damages clause, a legitimate interest will be found. The interest will be in 
providing the third party with compensation and preventing the defaulting party from 
escaping liability where the loss resulting from breach happens to fall elsewhere than on the 
promisee.98
The implications for third parties has also been held to be a relevant factor in the other 
contexts referred to by the Supreme Court in Makdessi, specific performance and the White 
and Carter scenario. Its potential relevance to specific performance is illustrated by Beswick 
v Beswick.99 Peter Beswick agreed to sell his business to his nephew in return for payments to 
his wife of £5 after his death. In breach of contract the nephew refused to pay the weekly 
annuity when his uncle died. The House of Lords held that the widow, acting as her 
husband's administratrix, could obtain specific performance of the obligation. Justice required 
that she should have a meaningful remedy. Whilst as a third party to the agreement between 
her husband and her nephew she could not obtain more than nominal damages, the defaulting 
nephew had received all the consideration under the contract without paying the price for it, 
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he owed a continuing obligation her, and the husband could have obtained specific 
performance.  
Similarly, in the White and Carter line of cases, if a third party would be negatively 
affected by the injured party being disabled from performing his obligations under the 
contract, this militates in favour of allowing him to perform rather than limiting him to a 
damages claim. An example can be found in Anglo-African Shipping Co v Mortner.100 The 
injured party had contracted to act as a confirming house and shipping agent in respect of an 
order for the purchase of goods made by the defaulting party with a third party supplier. In 
return, the defaulting party agreed to reimburse the injured party the purchase price and its 
expenses and make a commission payment. After the injured party had purchased and taken 
delivery of the goods from the supplier, the defaulting party repudiated the contract and 
refused to make any payment. The injured party nevertheless proceeded to deliver the goods 
to the defaulting party and sued for payment. Megaw J held that the injured party could 
recover the price of the goods, its expenses and the commission. He took into account that, if 
the injured party was prevented from performing its side of the contract and forced to accept 
the defaulting party's repudiation, this would have negatively affected third parties in that it 
would have led to the cancellation of sub-contracts. This was also a consideration in The 
Odenfeld.101 The fact that the owners of the vessel had an obligation to third parties, who 
were “entirely innocent”,102 to keep the charterparty in existence meant that they were not 
acting unreasonably in refusing the repudiation.
C. The Relevance of the Public Interest
The courts have even taken account of wider societal interests as either militating in favour of 
or against a conclusion that the injured party has a legitimate interest in obtaining 
performance rather than compensation. In Beavis, the Supreme Court found that the £85 
charge to deter motorists from overstaying beyond the 2 free hours of parking served the 
public interest, in that consumers and retailers benefited from having free parking for a 
limited period. It deterred commuters from occupying parking spaces for long periods and 
allowed ParkingEye to manage the use of the spaces efficiently.103
The desirability of taking societal interests into account when determining the validity 
of privately negotiated contract clauses has been questioned104 but is not without precedent. 
An example is restraint of trade clauses, which are enforceable only if reasonable with 
reference to the interests of the parties and not contrary to the public interest.105 The courts 
take account of the impact of the limitation of liberty to trade imposed by the clause upon the 
general welfare.106 This is said to require that “everyone should be free so far as practicable 
to earn a livelihood and to give to the public the fruits of his particular abilities”.107
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The public interest has also long been a relevant consideration in the context of 
specific relief. In Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd,108 for instance, an 
order requiring the demolition of a housing estate built in breach of a restrictive covenant was 
refused. The owner of the dominant tenement could show no loss and the demolition of the 
houses was unnecessary to preserve the integrity of the restrictive covenant. Brightman J also 
reasoned that to grant a mandatory order which required the demolition would amount to “an 
unpardonable waste of much needed houses”.109 Similarly, in Co-operative v Argyll,110 the 
House of Lords refused to order specific performance of a covenant in a 35-year lease which 
required a supermarket that was operating at a loss to be kept open for retail business. A 
factor that influenced this conclusion was that the public interest could not be served by 
requiring that a business be carried on at a loss if there was a plausible alternative way of 
compensating the injured party.111
Public interest considerations were also very obviously relevant in AG v Blake,112
where national security was at stake. The Crown had to remove any financial incentives for 
members of the intelligence service to disclose confidential information in order to protect 
public safety.
D. The Protection of Non-Financial Expectations 
Another factor likely to be relevant in determining whether the injured party has an interest in 
performance that goes beyond compensation is that the interest sought to be protected is non-
financial in nature.113 Compensation for non-pecuniary loss such as loss of reputation, 
frustration, and distress is heavily circumscribed in English law.114 A frequently cited reasons 
is that non-pecuniary loss is difficult to identify and prove and not readily susceptible to 
accurate and consistent measurement.115 Damages are therefore often unavailable. So as to 
redress this deficiency and provide a remedy that nonetheless protects the expectations of the 
injured party, the courts have at times devised creative solutions.
This is illustrated by AG v Blake.116 A factor that weighed in favour of the finding that 
the Crown had a legitimate interest in deterring breach and the award of gain-based damages 
was that the contracted-for benefit, that is, confidentiality, did not have a financial or market 
value. Since no recognised compensable loss had been suffered, compensatory damages were 
unavailable. An award of nominal damages was regarded as tantamount to costless 
permission to breach which, in practical terms, would render the confidentiality obligations 
unenforceable. Such an undesirable outcome was avoided by resorting to the gain-based 
remedy of an account of profits.117
That the protected interest is non-financial has also been found to be relevant in the 
White & Carter context. In Ministry of Sound (Ireland) Ltd v World Online Ltd,118 an internet 
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service provider entered into a contract for the distribution of compact discs and the provision 
of internet services with a group of companies operating nightclubs with whose brand it 
wished to be associated. It later repudiated the contract and refused to pay the last instalment 
due under a contract. In holding that the group of companies had an interest in the contract 
continuing such that they could continue to perform and obtain payment, the court had regard 
to the fact that they wanted to maintain the contract for non-financial reasons. The name of 
the nightclub business had become associated with the service provided by the repudiating 
internet service provider and the premature termination of this service would have been 
detrimental to them.119
That a damages clause which protects a non-financial interest is likely to be 
enforceable is also evident from the post-Makdessi case of Gray,120 which was concerned 
with a bad leaver provision in a company's Articles of Association. The company had an 
interest in the faithful and diligent performance by the shareholders of their duties as
employees and also in preserving its reputation. Although these interests were non-financial 
in nature, the company was entitled to protect them and the clause was not penal.
E. The Characteristics of the Contracting Parties
The characteristics of the parties are also potentially relevant. In Makdessi, Lord Neuberger 
and Lord Sumption said that “in a negotiated contract between properly advised parties of 
comparable bargaining power, the strong initial presumption must be that the parties 
themselves are the best judges of what is legitimate in a provision dealing with the 
consequences of breach”.121 These considerations were taken into account in Makdessi, with 
weight given to the fact that the contract had been the subject of detailed negotiations for 
many months between sophisticated commercial parties, dealing with each other on an equal 
basis with the benefit of specialist legal advice.122
These considerations are different from those already considered. They do not relate 
to the terms or objectives of the contract or the consequences of breach. Rather, they are 
concerned with the attributes of the parties and the circumstances in which the contract was 
negotiated. They are principally relevant to one class of contracting parties, that is, 
sophisticated, commercial parties of a substantial size. In effect, parties belonging to this 
class are treated differently and it is more likely that damages clauses that go beyond 
compensation in their contacts will be enforceable.123 As one commentator put it, “the ‘strong 
initial presumption’ approach suggests that affirmative evidence of procedural fairness may 
weigh heavily enough to turn a substantively dubious clause into one that passes the validity 
test”. In contrast, for parties not belonging to this class, there is a higher hurdle to satisfy.124
The relevance of the characteristics of the parties to the validity of a damages clause 
is not new. In the 20 years before Makdessi was decided, the courts had taken an increasingly 
liberal approach to damages clauses in commercial contracts that were large but not 
oppressive. There had been growing judicial reluctance to intervene and more inclination to 
respect the wishes of the parties by upholding freely negotiated damages clauses, even if the 
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stipulated sum was greater than the loss that was actually or might conceivably be suffered. 
Questions of whether the sum was a genuine pre-estimate of loss appeared to be displaced by 
consideration of a wider range of factors. These included the bargaining positions of the 
parties and whether they were advised,125 the commercial justifiability of the clause,126 and 
the reasonableness of the agreed sum.127
The rationale for the “strong initial presumption” is that contract terms that are 
genuinely negotiated at arm's length by sophisticated parties advised by experts are inherently 
unlikely to be abusive or oppressive. These parties are regarded as being capable of 
protecting their interests. If they consider that compensation is inadequate and require a 
remedy that is more robust, they should be taken to understand the interests at stake and 
implications. The court will be slow to interfere. 128
The presumption does however have the potential to make the requirement of a 
legitimate interest in performance easily satisfied. Sophisticated parties will usually have 
good (business) reasons for requiring performance as opposed to mere compensation. If the 
court interferes, this risks being perceived as the imposition of its own views over those of 
the parties as to what interests are deserving of protection, but it is questionable whether the 
court is equipped to make such commercial judgements or at least better equipped than the 
parties.
There is also evidence to suggest that, since Makdessi, practitioners and sophisticated 
parties have sought to reinforce the presumption by providing expressly in their contracts that 
they have a legitimate interest in performance. New boiler plate clauses can be found in 
online legal knowhow service for practitioners which state: “The parties confirm that these 
liquidated damages are reasonable and proportionate to protect [Party 1]’s legitimate interest 
in performance”.129 These clauses are an attempt to persuade the court still further that the 
remedy to which the parties have agreed is appropriate and reasonable, even if non-
compensatory in nature. They are intended to increase the likelihood that the remedy will be 
enforced. Whilst it is doubtful that the courts will feel bound by such provisions, it can be 
expected that in some cases they will have at least some bearing on whether a legitimate 
interest in the remedy is found to exist. 
V. CONCLUSION
The requirement of a legitimate interest in performance that goes beyond compensation in the 
new rule on penalties is somewhat elusive. It was not explained in any detail in Makdessi and 
its scope remains open to conjecture. Guidance can be found in concepts of legitimate interest 
that have featured in other contexts such as White and Carter, specific performance and gain-
based damages. However the parallels inevitably only go so far, not least because there is 
also uncertainty in relation to the requirement in some of these contexts. 
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As often is the case after a judgment that recasts an established rule, more cases are 
needed to define the scope of the requirement. Thus far, the cases that have followed 
Makdessi have focused mainly on other aspects of the new test, in particular the distinction 
between primary and secondary obligations130 and the requirement that the detriment 
imposed by the clause be unconscionable in comparison with the legitimate interest being 
protected.131 It is to be hoped that the requirement will soon benefit from similar judicial 
focus and can be articulated so as to be clearly understood by contracting parties and applied 
in a predictable manner. 
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